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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In September 2010, the European Council discussed for the first time the Euro-
pean Union’s (EU) strategic partnerships, a foreign policy concept that was until
then unknown to most people – including EU officials. This discussion was cer-
tainly needed in these times of geopolitical upheaval. The global shift of power
from the Atlantic to the Pacific forces the EU and its Member States to funda-
mentally rethink their foreign policy with a strong focus on great and emerging
powers; otherwise the EU is at risk of falling into global irrelevance. The 2009
Copenhagen climate conference was just a foretaste of what global irrelevance
could mean. The recent events in the Arab world have proved again that Europe
is not at ease with contemporary challenges, including in its own neighbour-
hood.
To cope with the coming multipolar world, the EU should invest time and
energy in its relationships with great and emerging powers, i.e. in the so-called
strategic partnerships, because the more the world becomes globalised and inter-
connected, the more the EU will be confronted with them – a confrontation that
can lead either to cooperation or competition. Given that all international actors
need one another if they are to cope with issues as crucial as climate change,
nuclear proliferation and sustainable development, cooperation should be priv-
ileged over competition. Current events in the Arab world – as important as they
are – should not distract the EU from its vital long-term strategic interest: secure
a relevant status in the coming multipolar environment dominated by great
powers.
On the basis of a review of EU documents, official and informal, as well as a
certain amount of interviews with European officials, this paper concludes that
the EU has today, in 2011, ten strategic partnerships with third countries: Brazil,
Canada, China, India, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, South Korea and
the United States. However, it is not entirely clear what is the exact reasoning
behind this list. Some countries (e.g. the US) are considered to be natural part-
ners of the EU, whereas others (e.g. China and Russia) are considered simply to
be too big to ignore. As for the other countries on the list, the strategic rationale
is far less evident. Their inclusion sometimes seems to be more the result of
political and institutional games than of a true strategic reflection, hence leading
to an “accidental” list of strategic partners.
The objectives that the EU is supposed to pursue globally through its strategic
partnerships are left entirely undefined. What are the EU’s global interests and
priorities? How can these interests and priorities be pursued? What is the role
of the strategic partners (cooperation or competition) in the pursuit of theseTHE TREACHERY OF STRATEGIES: A CALL FOR TRUE EU STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS
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interests and priorities? The 2003 European Security Strategy remains mute on
these fundamental questions, as it says more about how to do things than about
what exactly to do. Strategic partnerships thus unfold as instruments empty of
meaning and substance, with no clearly defined strategic direction.
Strategic partnerships are only strategic in name, for now. A historical overview
of documents and debates shows the total absence of strategic rationale behind
the elaboration of strategic partnerships since the very beginning, with no defi-
nition of the concept or of its fundamental objectives, and an ad hoc selection
of partners. This process of a-strategic thinking led to a repetition of past fail-
ures as the EU is now facing similar problems as it was ten years ago with the
Common Strategies, from which the partnerships derived, namely the difficulty
to turn rhetoric into concrete policies of strategic value vis-à-vis our partners. A
set of interviews with EU officials and European diplomats confirmed that stra-
tegic partnerships are to this day empty of any substance. This paper demon-
strates that strategic partnerships are not so strategic when looked at up-close
for a variety of reasons, including that 1) not every partner is equally strategic;
2) the EU is not cooperating with its partners on most truly strategic issues; 3)
the strategic partnership has no structural or institutional impact on the rela-
tionship; 4) or, finally, the EU itself is simply not considered as a strategic part-
ner in many cases.
This paper concludes that the recent revival of debates on strategic partnerships
is a positive step forward and that a strict implementation of the important
conclusions of the 2010 September European Council is now awaited. Overall,
this paper recommends reflecting on the EU’s global interests and priorities in
search of the EU’s grand strategy. True strategic partnerships, as this paper
brands them, could then be regarded as (sub-)strategies of the EU vis-à-vis great
and emerging powers. In addition to this general recommendation, this paper
makes several recommendations for the EU and its Member States to turn the
existing strategic partnerships into true strategic partnerships:
• Review the EU’s institutional set-up, in line with the strategic nature of the
partnerships, e.g. by establishing a cell dedicated to the strategic partnerships
within the EEAS, or by developing the EU delegations in terms of size and
composition to reflect the strategic character of the relationship.
• Review the EU’s internal arrangements, notably ensuring a greater coordina-
tion between the EU and the Member States vis-à-vis strategic partners.
• Review the bilateral arrangements between the EU and its strategic partners
in order to acknowledge the strategic importance of the relationship, e.g. by
establishing comprehensive and effective strategic dialogues as well as secto-
ral dialogues on security and defence, or by developing a culture of cooper-
ation on strategic issues.THE TREACHERY OF STRATEGIES: A CALL FOR TRUE EU STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS
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• Review the multilateral arrangements, according to the EU’s preference for
effective multilateralism, e.g. by boosting coordination and conflict media-
tion mechanisms within multilateral forums between the EU and its strategic
partners.vii
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1. INTRODUCTION
“The attempt and not the deed confounds us”
--- William Shakespeare (Macbeth Act 2 Scene 2)
In September 2010, the European Council discussed for the first time the Euro-
pean Union’s (EU) strategic partnerships, a foreign policy concept that was until
then unknown to most people – including EU officials. This discussion was cer-
tainly needed in these times of geopolitical upheaval. The global shift of power
from the Atlantic to the Pacific forces the EU and its Member States to funda-
mentally rethink their foreign policy with a strong focus on great and emerging
powers; otherwise the EU is at risk of falling into global irrelevance. The 2009
Copenhagen climate conference was just a foretaste of what global irrelevance
could mean.1 The recent events in the Arab world have proved again that
Europe is not at ease with contemporary challenges, including in its own neigh-
bourhood.
The EU adopted the concept of strategic partnership in the late 1990s-early
2000s. The problem, however, is that strategic partnerships cover two dimen-
sions in which the EU has traditionally been quite ineffective, i.e. a strategic
approach to foreign policy and bilateral relations with other powers. Hence, it
should be no surprise that recent debates on strategic partnerships have uncov-
ered the fundamental lack of strategy behind the partnerships. Most EU docu-
ments bearing the title “strategic partnership” are in fact reminiscent of the
painting by René Magritte: “ceci n’est pas un partenariat stratégique” (“this is
not a strategic partnership”).2
This paper is built on three sequential assumptions. First, strategic partnerships
are a necessary (sub-)strategy for the EU to cope successfully with the changing
global order and to avoid global irrelevance. Second, today’s strategic partner-
ships of the EU cannot reasonably be deemed strategic or even partnerships, for
they do not meet all criteria, and therefore they appear to be an unsatisfying tool
for the EU and its Member States. Third, the negative assessment of today’s
strategic partnerships does not preclude the development of true strategic part-
nerships tomorrow with established and emerging powers.
1. RENARD Thomas. 2010. “Le syndrome de Copenhague”. Revue Défense Nationale, n°731 (June),
pp. 155-161.
2. MAGRITTE René. 1928-29. The treachery of images (la trahison des images). Oil on canvas.THE TREACHERY OF STRATEGIES: A CALL FOR TRUE EU STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS
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To put these assumptions to the test, this paper starts with an assessment of the
international environment, which calls for the establishment of true strategic
partnerships between the EU and other major powers. The paper then moves on
to determine how the current strategic partnerships came into existence and
how they evolved to this day, based on a review of official EU documents as well
as on a large set of interviews conducted by this author since February 2009.
Finally, it evaluates the weaknesses of the current partnerships and provides
some recommendations on how to develop true strategic partnerships.
Let us emphasise here, finally, that this paper will focus exclusively on the EU
strategic partnerships with third countries, although we acknowledge the fact
that the EU also has regional strategic partnerships – which to a certain extent
might be seen as in contradiction or at least in competition with bilateral part-
nerships.
Thomas RENARD3
3. Thomas Renard is a Research Fellow in the Europe in the World programme at Egmont – Royal Insti-
tute for International Relations.3
2. A CALL FOR TRUE STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS
A new global order is emerging from the ashes of the Cold War, in a context of
growing complexity and uncertainty.4 The world is becoming increasingly
multipolar with the emergence of new powers in global affairs. To be sure, the
world remains dominated by the United States, but the American superpower is
increasingly challenged by emerging powers, not only economically but also
financially, militarily, politically and culturally. The emerging global order is
probably more fragmented than during the previous bipolar era, in the sense
that new strategic opportunities have opened for international actors searching
for a new power status. Emerging powers have become sufficiently assertive to
confront the West on some issues (sometimes individually, sometimes as a bloc),
but remain prudent enough to avoid endangering their rise by investing too
much in revisionist postures (e.g. powers in Asia have developed “hedging”
strategies via strategic partnerships to better safeguard their interests, but they
have not built an anti-Western alliance). This fragmentation makes international
cooperation to solve global challenges more difficult. On the other hand, the
world is increasingly interdependent and interconnected as largely illustrated by
the recent economic crisis. Global interdependence per se is not new, but accord-
ing to some scholars today’s interdependence is creating favourable conditions
for international cooperation, for there is simply no alternative to address some
of the most pressing global challenges.5 Thus, at the moment, the tension
between factors of fragmentation (leading possibly to a fracture?) and cohesion
maintains the international system in flux and makes it less predictable.
This new global order is creating a challenging environment for the EU and its
Member States, which seem to slowly but reluctantly recognise that Europe’s
place on the international chessboard is at risk. Europe’s “global irrelevance” is
now commonly being debated in Brussels and in major foreign capitals, in a
general climate of apathy or at best irony. Have Europeans already accepted
decline as their inevitable fate? They would be correct if they think in national
terms – former Belgian Minister Paul-Henri Spaak already warned decades ago
that “Europe consists only of small countries, some of which know it and some
of which don’t yet” – but the storyline could change if they would start acting
European. This paper is built on the assumption that Europe can and should
remain a central actor of History, not become its spectator. The EU is the natural
director of European action, and the picture can only get better with outstand-
ing national actors.
4. RENARD Thomas. 2009. A BRIC in the world: Europe, emerging powers and the coming order. Egmont
Paper 31. Brussels: Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations.
5. GREVI Giovanni. 2009. The interpolar world: a new scenario. Occasional Paper 79. Paris: EU Institute
for Security Studies.THE TREACHERY OF STRATEGIES: A CALL FOR TRUE EU STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS
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The EU has a lot of tools at its disposal to adapt successfully to the new global
order, building on the new provisions of the Lisbon Treaty. Indeed, the EU is a
potential power, a power in becoming – although what kind of power is not
clear yet. There have been many debates about the power of Europe, leading to
many innovative concepts. It is not the explicit objective of this paper to address
this question, although we consider the EU capable of developing a new form of
global action, mingling traditional and innovative forms of power into some-
thing that would build upon the strengths and complexities of the EU.
To cope with this multipolar world, the EU should invest time and energy in its
relationships with great and emerging powers, i.e. in the so-called strategic part-
nerships, because the more the world becomes globalised and interconnected,
the more the EU will be confronted with them – a confrontation that can lead
either to cooperation or to competition. Given that all international actors need
one another if they are to cope with issues as crucial as climate change, nuclear
proliferation and sustainable development, cooperation should be privileged
over competition.
Recent international events have highlighted the relevance of cooperation even
more. At the 2009 climate conference in Copenhagen, for instance, Europeans
were marginalised and sidelined by the US and a group of emerging powers, all
supposedly strategic partners of the EU. In the spring of 2010, Barack Obama
declined the invitation to a EU-US Summit in Madrid, strengthening a feeling of
marginalisation in transatlantic relations among Europeans in addition to a
sense of sidelining in international affairs. The Chinese bailout of Europe, trig-
gering ambivalent sentiments across the continent, was yet another illustration
of the increasingly complex relationship between the EU and its strategic part-
ners.
In the face of these events and of global changes, the EU decided to take action
and its Member States started to debate its strategic partnerships in September
2010, following the initial impulse of Herman Van Rompuy, President of the
European Council. This author strongly applauds this initiative and encourages
its continuation – if debates lead to results and implementation (as opposed to
most strategic debates in Europe). The stakes are high and failure to reach
results would postpone this debate to a distant future. The world is moving
faster than ever, whereas Europe is plagued with national-narcissism and polit-
ical immobilism. We should simply beware of missing this opportunity.
Recent debates were a good start, but they were precisely just that: a beginning.
Now we – as Europeans – need to keep the debate moving and rapidly gather
speed. We need to hold two kinds of debates regarding the strategic partner-THE TREACHERY OF STRATEGIES: A CALL FOR TRUE EU STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS
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ships: 1) discussing among ourselves what are the objectives of a strategic
partnership and which are our true strategic partners; and 2) at the bilateral
level, discussing our mutual strategic interests with our various partners. This
paper focuses mainly on the first level, although it will address the second level
when deemed useful or necessary.
The starting hypothesis of this paper is that the existing list of strategic partners
was established for various reasons, but not based on an assessment of their
strategic value. Indeed, there is to this day no definition of strategic partnerships
or of EU strategic interests globally and regionally, hence making the current list
of strategic partnerships a rather “accidental” one but certainly not a strategic
one. Moreover, a closer look at the substance of these partnerships clearly
reveals their lack of strategic character.
This paper argues that a clarification of the concept is in order, as well as an
urgent reflection on our strategic interests, in the pursuit of true strategic part-
nerships. Implementation of these true strategic partnerships is long awaited. In
other words, time has come to move from strategic partnerships as a concept to
strategic partnerships as a foreign policy instrument. Thus, it is suggested to
distinguish the existing strategic partnerships, which are mere rhetorical state-
ments, from the true strategic partnerships, which this paper envisions as (sub-
)strategies for the EU to apply its general foreign policy guidelines – its grand
strategy – to some of its most important partners.
A true strategic partner can be defined as a key global player which has a pivotal
role in solving global challenges – in the sense that the EU cannot hope to solve
these issues without the positive contribution of that partner – and which is
willing to cooperate with the EU to solve these challenges, preferably in a mul-
tilateral framework – e.g. by coordinating our position with those strategic part-
ners in multilateral forums. The ultimate objective of these true strategic part-
nerships is to safeguard the EU’s vital interests, which many times involves the
necessary cooperation with its strategic partners. The true strategic partnerships
can also be seen as a tool to slow down the global fragmentation of international
relations, by active strategic and diplomatic efforts of the EU.
The strategic partnerships in this sense go beyond bilateral relations and focus
on the instrumentalisation of this bilateral relationship for broader ends (i.e.
regional or, better, global goals). The bilateral relationship per se is not the core
finalité of the strategic partnership, although the depth and the quality of the
bilateral relationship obviously determine the potential of the strategic partner-
ship, and therefore the former remains crucially important to the latter.THE TREACHERY OF STRATEGIES: A CALL FOR TRUE EU STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS
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What makes a partnership “strategic”? First, a strategic partnership must be
comprehensive, in order to allow linkages and tradeoffs between various poli-
cies. Second, it must be built upon reciprocity, short of which it cannot be
deemed a partnership at all. Third, a strategic partnership has a strong empathic
dimension, which means that both partners share a common understanding of
their mutual values and objectives. Fourth, a strategic partnership must be ori-
ented towards the long-term, which is to say that it is not put into question by
casual disputes. Finally, a strategic partnership must go beyond bilateral issues
to tackle (with the potential to solve) regional and global challenges, because
that is its true raison d’être.
Based on those standards, how strategic are the EU’s “strategic partnerships”?
Among the current ten strategic partnerships (with Brazil, Canada, China, India,
Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, South Korea and the United States) prob-
ably only the US-relationship qualifies as a true strategic partnership. The others
are, among other things, not comprehensive (e.g. India and Japan), not oriented
towards global issues (e.g. South Africa) or not based on reciprocity and empa-
thy (e.g. Russia and China).
In the new global environment, the EU cannot afford to have only one true
strategic partner, even if that is the American superpower. In today’s world, the
EU needs to develop true strategic partnerships with tomorrow’s great powers,
because it takes time to build sustainable trust among partners in order to col-
lectively address global threats and challenges. At the end of the day, what truly
matters is not how much power you have or what kind of power you are, as the
US is now experiencing the hard way in Iraq and Afghanistan, but how you
make use of that power. Strategic partnerships are precisely a blueprint for a
smart use of the EU’s (and therefore Europe’s) power.7
3. DUST THIS OFF: TOWARDS A NEW USE OF 
STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS
Due to the paucity of literature on the EU’s strategic partnerships, this paper
offers a historical overview of debates and documents related to this concept up
to this day, in order to better understand where it comes from, what was the
original rationale behind it, and how this rationale evolved.
Uncommon strategies or the original lack of rationale
The concept of strategic partnership emerged from the post-Cold War era.6
Countries, particularly in Eurasia and in Asia, reacted to the demise of the bipo-
lar order by developing new “hedging” strategies to deal in a flexible manner
with the “lonely superpower” and with other regional powers at the same time,
without committing to new forms of alliance in troubled and uncertain times.
For a former superpower like Russia and for emerging powers like China and
India, the international environment was simply too uncertain and evolving too
rapidly to opt for a definitive bandwagoning or balancing posture at the global
(vis-à-vis the US) and regional (vis-à-vis other regional powers) levels.7
Building on this new international concept, the EU used the expression “strate-
gic partnership” for the first time at the highest level in 1998, in the European
Council conclusions, which reaffirmed “Russia’s importance as a strategic part-
ner to the Union”.8 Six months later, the European Council was putting to use
the innovations brought by the Amsterdam Treaty in the field of the Common
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) to adopt a Common Strategy on Russia,
which was meant to “strengthen the strategic partnership between Russia and
the European Union”.9 Article 13.2 of the Amsterdam Treaty indeed provided
that:
The European Council shall decide on common strategies to be imple-
mented by the Union in areas where the Member States have important
interests in common. Common strategies shall set out their objectives,
duration and the means to be made available by the Union and the Mem-
ber States.
6. KAY Sean. 2000. “What is a strategic partnership?”. Problems of Post-Communism, n°47, pp. 15-24.
7. NADKARNI Vidya. 2010. Strategic partnerships in Asia: Balancing without alliances. Abingdon:
Routledge.
8. European Council. 1998. Presidency conclusions. Vienna.
9. European Council. 1999. Presidency conclusions. Cologne.THE TREACHERY OF STRATEGIES: A CALL FOR TRUE EU STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS
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The European Council adopted two additional Common Strategies afterwards,
on Ukraine and the Mediterranean, while emphasising the “strategic impor-
tance” of Latin America and Africa. Hence, originally, it seems that the concept
of “strategic partnership” was born out of rhetoric related to the adoption of
Common Strategies towards third countries (Russia and Ukraine) and third
regions (Mediterranean, Latin America and Africa). Nonetheless, whereas the
so-called “Common Strategies” have been lost in EU history, the strategic part-
nerships have somehow survived to this day despite all uncertainties still sur-
rounding the concept.
Save Russia, no countries were described consistently as strategic partners in the
late 1990s. This is not to say, however, that Russia was considered to be the sole
or even the main partner of the EU. The US unequivocally remained the princi-
pal ally of Europe (notably via NATO), but the “strategic partnership” rhetoric
was first developed in the context of the relations with Moscow, probably as a
consequence of growing frustrations at the European level due to the lack of
effective and visible policies vis-à-vis Russia.10 Hence, for instance, the transat-
lantic partnership was depicted as “the leading force for peace and prosperity
for ourselves and for the world”11 whereas the relationship with Japan was not
yet dubbed strategic either, but already went beyond mere bilateral issues as
both parties were “aware of the importance of deepening their dialogue in order
to make a joint contribution towards safeguarding peace in the world, setting
up a just and stable international order in accordance with the principles and
purposes of the United Nations Charter and taking up the global challenges that
the international community has to face.”12
All this seems to confirm that the concept of strategic partnership was linked, in
the beginning, to the implementation of Common Strategies and to the particu-
lar context of uncertainty in the 1990-2000s due to the emergence of a new
world order, the normalisation of relations with the post-Soviet space, and the
growing (tentative) assertiveness of the EU on the international stage.
The European Security Strategy (ESS), published in 2003, was the first docu-
ment to envision the strategic partnerships as a (sort of) foreign policy tool. It is
true that this document was more political than strategic, in the context of the
Iraq war and of the resulting transatlantic and intra-European dissensions, but
it was the first document to formulate objectives in connection with the pursuit
10. HAUKKALA Hiski. 2000. The making of the European Union’s Common Strategy on Russia. Working
Paper 28. Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs.
11. The New Transatlantic Agenda. 1995. Madrid: EU-US Summit.
12. Joint declaration on relations between the European Community and its member states and Japan.
1991. The Hague.THE TREACHERY OF STRATEGIES: A CALL FOR TRUE EU STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS
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of strategic partnerships, even if these objectives are abstract in their formula-
tion and limited in their scope:
There are few if any problems we can deal with on our own. The threats
described above are common threats, shared with all our closest partners.
International cooperation is a necessity. We need to pursue our objectives
both through multilateral cooperation in international organisations and
through partnerships with key actors.13
It is also in the ESS that we discovered for the very first time, in print, a list of
the EU’s strategic partners. The document mentions six partners: it singles out
the US (“the irreplaceable partner”) and Russia (with whom we should work
“to reinforce progress towards a strategic partnership”), then adding as one
group Japan, China, Canada and India (with whom “we should look to develop
a strategic partnership”). The formulation of this list indicates that it was an
open one, although as noted by some scholars, “the criteria to evaluate who
qualifies as a potential partner are left virtually unspecified”.14 The only indica-
tion regarding who could become a strategic partner was particularly vague: “all
those who share our goals and values, and are prepared to act in their support”.
Furthermore, the ESS tells us that most strategic partnerships should still be
regarded as an objective to pursue rather than a depiction of the reality in 2003.
The objectives that the EU is supposed to pursue, notably through its strategic
partnerships, are unfortunately not developed in the ESS. What are these objec-
tives? What are the EU’s interests and priorities in the field of foreign policy?
The ESS remains mute on these fundamental questions, as it says more how to
do things rather than what exactly to do.15 Strategic partnerships thus unfold as
instruments empty of meaning and substance, with no clearly defined strategic
direction.
Despite all these major problems, which remain to a large extent unaddressed to
this day, the EU has developed a certain number of strategic partnerships based
on the recommendations of the ESS. More precisely, the European Commission
followed suit of the European Council (which had initiated the Common Strat-
egies and the ESS) and produced a series of documents intended to feed into the
general elaboration of strategic partnerships.
13. Council of the European Union. 2003. A secure Europe in a better world – European Security Strat-
egy. Brussels.
14. MENOTTI Roberto, VENCATO Francesca. 2008. “The European Security Strategy and the partners”. In
BISCOP Sven, ANDERSSON Jan Joel (ed). The EU and the European Security Strategy. Abingdon: Routledge,
p. 115.
15. BISCOP Sven (ed). 2009. The value of power, the power of values: A call for an EU grand strategy.
Egmont Paper 33. Brussels: Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations.THE TREACHERY OF STRATEGIES: A CALL FOR TRUE EU STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS
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In fact, the first document of this kind was released in September 2003, a few
months before the publication of the ESS, hence initiating the first strategic
partnership with an emerging power, namely China. This document is entitled
“A maturing partnership - shared interests and challenges in EU-China rela-
tions”.16 The Commission released similar documents vis-à-vis India (2004),
South Africa (2006), Brazil (2007) and Mexico (2008).17
These documents do not establish a strategic partnership by themselves, how-
ever. On the one hand, these are “Communications from the Commission to the
Council and the European Parliament”, that is to say internal and unilateral
European documents and thus not a partnership. On the other hand, these are
documents calling for the EU to establish a strategic partnership with each
emerging country, which cannot therefore be qualified as strategic partners yet
at the time of publication. Moreover, in the case of South Africa, Brazil and
Mexico, the document is entitled “Towards a strategic partnership” (the key
being the word “towards”), hence highlighting that such partnership is an objec-
tive, but not yet a reality.
Let us note here that these “Communications from the Commission” seem to
have been generally well orchestrated, at the European level as well as bilaterally
with the partners, given the short lapse of time separating the publication of the
document from its adoption by the European Council (and from a favourable
recommendation from the European parliament), on the one side, and subse-
quently from a “Joint Statement” of both partners during a bilateral Summit
announcing the upgrading of the relationship to a strategic partnership, on the
other side (China in October 2003, India in September 2005, South Africa in
May 2007, Brazil in July 2007, and Mexico in May 2010). This good orchestra-
tion, however, does not suffice to make the partnerships strategic.
These “Communications” and “Joint Statements” adopted during bilateral
Summits, without forgetting the “Joint Action Plans”, are surely no guarantee
of the strategic nature of a partnership. These documents resemble declarations
of interest, they are a to-do list or a wish list, but they offer no strategic vision
for the bilateral relationship. These “Communications from the Commission”,
for instance, analyse systematically a certain amount of thematic issues in which
the EU and its partners could deepen their relations. This approach is of a cer-
16. European Commission. 2003. A maturing partnership: shared interest and challenges in EU-China
relations. (COM 533), Brussels.
17. European Commission. 2004. An EU-India strategic partnership. (COM 430), Brussels; European
Commission. 2006. Towards an EU-South Africa strategic partnership. (COM 347), Brussels; European
Commission. 2007. Towards an EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership. (COM 281), Brussels; European Com-
mission. 2008. Towards an EU-Mexico Strategic Partnership. (COM 447), Brussels.THE TREACHERY OF STRATEGIES: A CALL FOR TRUE EU STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS
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tain value, but it cannot be deemed strategic for it leaves aside the issues of
mutual interest and, even more importantly, divergent interests (at the bilateral,
regional and global levels), as well as the question of the objectives of the
partnership and what the EU is ready to trade off for these objectives. In short,
these documents offer only cosmetic changes to the relationship, as the upgrade
is more symbolic and rhetorical than a fundamental redesign of these relation-
ships. It is not encouraging to notice that these criticisms are similar to those
raised against the Common Strategies, over 10 years ago.18
The 2008 “Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy”
underscores the progress accomplished regarding the strategic partnerships,
notably thanks to the efforts of the European Commission and to the adoption
of “Joint Action Plans”. When it comes to the objectives of the partnerships
however, the report is no more detailed than the 2003 ESS, except that it speci-
fies that one of the fundamental objectives of the partnerships is to promote
“effective multilateralism”, Brussels jargon referring to a rule-based multilateral
order. As for the list of strategic partners, the report maintains a lot of confusion:
in addition to the partners from the 2003 ESS, the report also mentions Switzer-
land and Norway, for instance, along with a certain amount of international
organisations.
It appears therefore that in 2008, ten years after the beginning of discussions on
strategic partnerships, the concept was still not defined and that there still was
no official list of the EU’s strategic partners. It was still a rhetorical expression,
celebrating the growing importance of a bilateral relationship, with no clear
global strategic vision. The absence of any public European document on the
strategic partnerships, as well as the complete lack of knowledge about this con-
cept and of its implications among the staff tasked with these issues within the
European institutions indicate the absence of global strategic vision on the Euro-
pean side.19 There was indeed one or the other internal note circulated within
the Commission, notably ahead of the establishing of a strategic partnership
with Brazil and Mexico, but even those documents seemed to be incapable of
explaining the meaning and objectives of the strategic partnerships.20
By comparison, some strategic partners of the EU seem to have a much more
strategic vision of Europe. China, among others, does not hesitate to play on
internal European divisions to obtain what it desires. Other illustration: a Euro-
pean official pointed out during an interview that the absence of European strat-
18. HAUKKALA Hiski. 2000. op. cit.
19. Observation based on more than 30 interviews carried in 2010 by this author in Brussels and within
EU/European delegations abroad.
20. Interview with a staff member of the European Commission, Brussels, 7 July 2010.THE TREACHERY OF STRATEGIES: A CALL FOR TRUE EU STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS
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egy is visible notably on the occasion of bilateral summits, in the sense that our
partners come systematically better prepared than Europeans, with a clearer
idea of what they want and how to get it.21 More generally, great powers (par-
ticularly the US) and emerging powers systematically pursue a clearly defined
grand strategy, whereas the EU is still in quest of its own identity. In the words
of Brigadier-General (R.) Jo Coelmont: “While the EU is playing ping pong, they
are playing chess.”22
The Lisbon Treaty and the rebirth of the strategic 
partnerships
The EU’s foreign policy took a new turn with the entry into force of the Lisbon
Treaty on 1st December 2009. Indeed, a certain amount of changes foreseen by
the Treaty should23 bring more coherence and continuity into European external
action. Among major changes, one can mention the designation of a new High
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (with extended powers in
comparison to her predecessor) or the creation of a new European diplomatic
corps (the famous European External Action Service – EEAS).24
These changes permitted to rethink the relationship between the EU and third
countries, notably in the framework of strategic partnerships. It is precisely a
newly appointed figure, Herman Van Rompuy, first permanent president of the
European Council, who (re-)started the debate on the partnerships. In February
2010, on the occasion of his first major foreign policy speech, he mentioned the
strategic partnerships as a key priority of the EU in terms of foreign policy:
We need to review and strengthen our relationship with key partners. I
am above all thinking about the United States, Canada, Russia, China,
Japan, India, Brazil.25
Catherine Ashton, the new High Representative, followed in the steps of Van
Rompuy and in July 2010 declared the strategic partnerships to be one of her
main priorities for 2010 and beyond:
21. Interview with a staff member of the European Commission, Brussels, 23 June 2010.
22. BISCOP Sven (ed.). 2009. op. cit.
23. It is important to emphasise the conditional here, because instruments foreseen by the Treaty will be
fully exploited only if there is sufficient political will to do so.
24. CEPS, EGMONT and EPC. 2010. The Treaty of Lisbon: A second look at the institutional innova-
tions. Brussels: Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations.
25. VAN ROMPUY Herman. 2010. The challenges for Europe in a changing world. Speech at the College of
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In this world I have described where problems are global, and where
power is shifting, we need to invest in partnerships, keeping up the work
with our “established partnerships” such as the US, Russia, Japan and
Canada, and focussing too on developing our relationships with powers
that are emerging or have emerged, China, India, Brazil, South Africa,
Indonesia.26
After a quick overview of both statements, two elements seem particularly
important. On the one hand, the list of partnerships seems to differ between the
two top figures of EU foreign policy, seemingly confirming the lack of in-depth
background reflection on this issue on the eve of the summer of 2010, as this
author has highlighted before.27 On the other hand, whereas Van Rompuy does
not seem to differentiate the partnerships, Ashton separates “established” pow-
ers from “emerging” powers – an issue that will be looked into more deeply
below.
José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission and the third key
actor in European foreign policy, did not fail either to mention the strategic
partnerships as crucial for the EU to pull its weight on the global stage, on the
occasion of his first-ever “State of the Union” speech, on 7 September 2010:
Our partners are watching and are expecting us to engage as Europe, not
just as 27 individual countries. If we don’t act together, Europe will not
be a force in the world, and [our strategic partners] will move on without
us.28
Even leaving aside core issues of international security, Barroso also highlighted
the crucial importance of the strategic partnerships domestically, namely for the
socio-economic situation in Europe:
In our globalised world, the relationships we build with strategic partners
determine our prosperity.29
If strategic partnerships were mentioned among the priorities of these three
prominent figures of EU foreign policy from early 2010, the debate on the issue
26. ASHTON Catherine. 2010. Europe and the world. Speech at Megaron ‘The Athens Concert Hall’, Ath-
ens, 8 July, p. 7.
27. BISCOP Sven, RENARD Thomas. 2009. “EU strategic partnerships lack content”. EUObserver, 27
August. Observation confirmed during a roundtable organised by the Egmont Institute, Brussels, 7 July
2010.
28. BARROSO José Manuel. 2010. State of the Union 2010. Speech to the European Parliament, Stras-
bourg, 7 September, p.8.
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remained entirely below the radar screen until the end of summer recess.30
Indeed, when Herman Van Rompuy in June 2010 called for an extraordinary
European Council to be held three months later and to be dedicated to the stra-
tegic partnerships,31 few diplomats seemed to be prepared.32 A loose agenda for
the meeting coupled to a very fuzzy topic turned out to be a perfect recipe for
chaotic preparation, as some diplomats complained.33
In order to give more substance to the 16 September European Council, it was
decided in July that a Gymnich (the first under the new “Lisbon” format) would
precede the European Council on 10-11 September, and that the 27 Ministers of
Foreign Affairs would later attend the European Council to ensure continuity in
the debates. Unsurprisingly, the level of preparation varied greatly from one
Member State to another in function of their interest for the topic. Nonetheless,
a certain amount of Member States, including France and Germany, shared sev-
eral key ideas ahead of the Gymnich via an exchange of letters, in which some of
the core elements of the European Council’s conclusions were already drafted.34
The 27 (finally) debate the strategic partnerships
During the Gymnich, the Foreign Ministers focused mainly on China (and to a
lesser extent on India) as a “template” to debate strategic partnerships. More-
over, Catherine Ashton, chairing the debates according to the new rules, encour-
aged her colleagues to envision the partnerships in a comprehensive manner,
notably by inviting EU Commissioners for economic and financial issues (Olli
Rehn), climate (Connie Hedegaard) and trade (Karel De Gucht) to join the dis-
cussions.
What emerged from the discussions was a convergence of views on the fact that
Europe is still punching below its weight and that it is only when acting together
that the EU can hope to become itself a strategic partner. There seemed to be a
convergence of views as well on the necessity to develop a strategic approach
towards our partners – of which, as will be shown below, Catherine Ashton took
note.35
30. Interview with a staff member of the European Commission, Brussels, 11 June 2010. Interview with a
staff member of Herman Van Rompuy’s cabinet, Brussels, 7 July 2010.
31. MAHONY Honor. 2010. “Van Rompuy planning ‘foreign policy’ summit”. EUObserver, 11 June.
32. Interview with a staff member of the European Commission, Brussels, 11 June 2010. Observation
confirmed during a roundtable organised by the Egmont Institute, Brussels, 7 July 2010.
33. TAYLOR Simon. 2010. “Van Rompuy’s summitry fails to convince”. EuropeanVoice, 23 September.
34. Interview with a European diplomat, Brussels, 27 September 2010.
35. Interview with a European diplomat, Paris, 15 September 2010. Interview with a European diplomat,
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The 16 September European Council was extraordinary for two reasons. First,
it was an ad hoc summit and de facto an extraordinary Council. Second, and
more importantly, it aimed to discuss for the first time and at the highest level
(the Gymnich being considered as a preliminary to the European Council) the
instrument called “strategic partnerships”. Unfortunately, the extraordinary
dimension of this second point went largely unnoticed in the media and in public
opinion – in Europe and worldwide – partly due to the hyped row over the
Roma issue, between French President Nicolas Sarkozy and European Commis-
sioner Viviane Reding.36 However, another explanation for this lack of coverage
cannot be provided, other than a lack of appetite from traditional media for
such broad discussions and a certain désenchantement with the CFSP.
The fact is that Europe was (again) showing a divided front at a critical moment.
Barely two days after six of the nine EU strategic partners voted against – or
abstained from supporting – a UN resolution to upgrade the EU status accord-
ing to its new competences,37 this internal feud was sending one additional neg-
ative signal to our strategic partners, whereas some of them are already overtly
questioning the strategic value of the EU.
If the European Council was the stage for some internal quarrels, the question
of strategic partnerships was nonetheless addressed, notably on the basis of a
PowerPoint presentation by Catherine Ashton establishing a list of nine strategic
partners – the first such compilation to the knowledge of this author, confirming
the list compiled by this author himself previously38 – and paving the way for
additional partnerships in the future, namely South Korea and Indonesia (see
infra).39 Discussions let appear some disagreements among Member States,
mainly regarding the list of truly strategic partners; disagreements seemingly
resulting fundamentally from historic and cultural differences among Member
States.
The discussions turned out to focus mainly on European coordination mecha-
nisms to become more strategic in our approach to strategic partners, and to
pull the EU’s full weight on the international stage. These mechanisms should be
regarded as extremely important and are a positive step towards a strategic
approach to foreign policy. They aim to increase coordination and coherence
36. RICARD Philippe, VAN RENTERGHEM Marion, LEPARMENTIER Arnaud. 2010. “Déjeuner de fiel à Brux-
elles”. Le Monde, 21 September.
37. VOGEL Toby. 2010. “UN General Assembly postpones vote on special status for the EU”. European-
Voice, 14 September.
38. BISCOP Sven, RENARD Thomas. 2009. “The EU’s strategic partnerships with the BRIC: Where’s the
Strategy?”. BEPA Monthly Brief, n°29, pp. 6-8.
39. RETTMAN Andrew. 2010. “Ashton designates six new ‘strategic partners’”. EUObserver, 16 Septem-
ber.THE TREACHERY OF STRATEGIES: A CALL FOR TRUE EU STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS
16
between the EU and its Member states, but also between European institutions.
These discussions resulted in the adoption of “internal arrangements to improve
the European Union’s external policy” as an annex to the Council’s conclusions.
This resulted in coordination mechanisms within the EU:
Close and regular coordination between all the different institutional
actors involved in the definition and implementation of the European
Union’s external relations is necessary to ensure that EU representatives
can defend coherent positions on the whole range of the strategic interests
and objectives of the Union.40
The arrangements also foresee not-less-essential coordination mechanisms
between the EU and its Member States:
Synergies need to be developed between the European Union’s external
relations and Member States bilateral relations with third countries, so
that, where appropriate, what is done at the level of the European Union
complements and reinforces what is done at the level of the Member Sta-
tes and vice versa.41
The conclusions of the September European Council include many interesting
observations and crucial recommendations for a strategic approach to the part-
nerships. It was very significant that the conclusions recognised for the first time
that the strategic partnerships are an important instrument of foreign policy:
“the European Union’s strategic partnerships with key players in the world pro-
vide a useful instrument for pursuing European objectives and interests.”42 The
European Council also recognised the need for the EU to completely rethink its
foreign policy in more strategic terms: “in accordance with the Lisbon Treaty,
and in line with the European Security Strategy, the European Union and its
Member States will act more strategically so as to bring Europe’s true weight to
bear internationally. This requires a clear identification of its strategic interests
and objectives at a given moment and focused reflection on the means to pursue
them more assertively.”43
Thus, despite the negative atmosphere surrounding the September 2010 Euro-
pean Council, its conclusions are largely interpreted as a step forward in this
debate. What Europe needs now is implementation as well as follow-up of these
conclusions.
40. European Council. 2010. European Council conclusions on 16 September 2010. Brussels, p. 8.
41. Ibid.
42. European Council. 2010. op. cit., p. 2.
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Progress (reports) in sight for the strategic partnerships
In his personal conclusions to the Summit, Van Rompuy highlighted several key
points of the European Council’s discussions.44 The three following were partic-
ularly important:
• This extraordinary European Council was only the beginning of a longer
debate on EU foreign policy. Catherine Ashton was tasked “in coordination
with the Commission and with the Foreign Affairs Council, to evaluate the
prospects of relations with all strategic partners, and set out in particular our
interests and possible leverage to achieve them.”45 Her first progress reports
on the partnerships were awaited for December 2010 (see infra).
• Reciprocity is a very important notion in the framework of strategic partner-
ships.
• It was confirmed that in terms of foreign policy, the mandate would be issued
by the European Council, but prepared and implemented by the Foreign
Affairs Council, the Commission, and the High Representative. In other
words, the idea is that during summits with EU strategic partners the latter
feel convinced that EU messages “have a political backing of all EU 27 at the
level of Heads of State and Government and are not only a product of the
Brussels institutions.”46
Concerning the first point (the so-called progress reports) it was important that
European Heads of State and Government and diplomats admit that this debate
over strategic partnerships was just the beginning of a longer process, not its
conclusion. An advisor to Ashton actually recognised that this topic was meant
to remain permanently or at least for a long time on the agenda of the High
Representative.47
In December 2010, Catherine Ashton delivered her first intermediate progress
reports on the strategic partnerships – covering the USA, China and Russia,
suggesting implicitly yet unsurprisingly that these three partnerships rank higher
in EU priorities. These first reports wisely identify common elements to all part-
nerships while taking into account the specific characteristics of each bilateral
relationship.48 The reports also seem to confirm that one of the fundamental
44. VAN ROMPUY Herman. 2010. Remarks by Herman Van Rompuy President of the European Council
at the press conference following the meeting of Heads of State or Government (PCE 188/10). Brussels,
16 September.
45. European Council. 2010. op. cit., p. 9.
46. VAN ROMPUY Herman. 2010. Invitation letter by President Herman Van Rompuy to the European
Council (PCE 187/10). Brussels, 14 September.
47. Interview with a European diplomat, Brussels, 13 December 2010.
48. This author had suggested precisely that approach in previous research. RENARD Thomas. 2010. Strat-
egy wanted: The European Union and strategic partnerships. Security Policy Brief 13. Brussels: Egmont –
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objectives of the partnerships is the pursuit of “effective multilateralism” and
the coordination between the EU and its partners within multilateral organisa-
tions.49 In general, European diplomats positively welcomed the progress
reports. Further reports should extend to additional partners in 2011, notably
India, Brazil and South Africa.50
The first progress reports furthermore suggest to determine a limited amount of
clearly identified priorities and objectives for each partnership: What are the EU
objectives? What are our partners’ objectives? What are our shared interests?
Existing bilateral and multilateral mechanisms (“the architecture of the relation-
ship”) should be used to their maximum, the reports further suggest, and link-
ages and tradeoffs between complex issues pertaining to different sectors estab-
lished, not hesitating to put again on the table some taboo topics. For instance,
Ashton re-ignited the debate on the Chinese arms embargo, in order to obtain
more from China on other issues, even if this initiative seems to have received a
no-go from several Member States. Regarding the report on Russia, it suggests
to move from two summits per year to only one annual summit (like for other
strategic partners) for the sake of coherence and efficiency (two central elements
in the new rationale behind strategic partnerships) while making sure that this
move is not interpreted by Moscow as hostile.51
Several questions remain open regarding these first progress reports, nonethe-
less. For instance: what is the exact role of these documents? Is it foreseen to
have one single overall document guiding them all, determining one common
method and set of objectives? How to implement these documents concretely?
Finally, how to integrate these documents (and eventually the overall one) into
a global foreign policy strategy, in other words into a grand strategy?
Concerning the second point (reciprocity), it is necessary to point out that this
notion appears for the first time in the framework of the strategic partnerships
– even if limited to the September 2010 European Council conclusions’ pream-
ble – despite the reluctance of some Member States which preferred less con-
straining notions such as “mutual benefits”.52 Reciprocity is a central theme to
the strategic partnerships because short of reciprocity there is simply no partner-
ship.
49. Interview with a European diplomat, Brussels, 23 December 2010.
50. Interview with a European diplomat, Brussels, 30 December 2010.
51. RETTMAN Andrew. 2010. “Ashton pragmatic on China in EU foreign policy blueprint”, EUObserver,
17 December.
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Regarding the third point (implementation and follow-up), the strategic part-
nerships remain for the moment a regular item on the Foreign Affairs Council
and meetings are organised under the chairmanship of Catherine Ashton with
the RELEX Commissioners (trade, Karel De Gucht; enlargement and neigh-
bourhood, Stefan Füle; development, Andris Pielbags) as well as with the Com-
missioners for climate (Connie Hedegaard) and energy (Günther Oettinger).
Several proposals have also been formulated with a view to ensure a better fol-
low-up of these issues at the political level, for instance by organising an annual
European summit around the same time of the year.53
To conclude this section, let us mention two more issues. Firstly, in the months
following the September European Council, the EU had a series of important
meetings with its strategic partners, notably summits with China, India, Russia
and the US, without forgetting the Europe-Asia Meeting (ASEM). Most observ-
ers rated the outcome of some of these summits poorly. Evidently, it is too soon
to assess the new European strategic approach. Hence, 2011 will become the
first official test for the strategic partnerships. Secondly, on 6 October 2010,
during the EU-South Korea summit, the EU signed a Free Trade Agreement
(FTA) with its Asian counterpart, and the two actors decided to jointly upgrade
their relationship to the strategic level.54 South Korea has consequently become
the tenth strategic partner of the EU.
53. Interview with a European diplomat, Brussels, 30 November 2010.
54. European Council. 2010. EU-Republic of Korea Summit, Joint Press Statement (14547/10), Brussels,
6 October.21
4. STRATEGIC OR NOT STRATEGIC? THAT IS THE 
QUESTION…
On the basis of a review of EU documents, official and informal, as well as a
certain amount of interviews with European officials, this author concludes that
the EU has today, in 2011, ten strategic partnerships with third countries (see
Map): Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, South
Korea and the United States.55
Map: The European Union and its strategic partners
We have seen in which order and in which manner these partnerships were
established. However, it is not entirely clear what is the exact reasoning behind
this list. Some countries (e.g. the US) are considered to be natural partners of the
EU, whereas others (e.g. China and Russia) are considered simply too big to
ignore. As for the other countries on the list, the strategic rationale is far less
evident. Their inclusion sometimes seems to be more the result of political and
institutional games than of a true strategic reflection.
55. The EU also has five strategic partnerships with two regions and three organisations: Latin America
and the Caribbean, the Mediterranean and the Middle East (we should note however that the strategic
partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East, agreed in 2004, is no longer the reference docu-
ment in our relationship with that region since we now have other arrangements, such as the Union for
the Mediterranean), the UN, the African Union, and NATO. However, the objectives of these partner-
ships seem different from those with third countries and they should therefore be treated separately. In
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The 2008 Communication of the Commission “Towards an EU-Mexico Strate-
gic Partnership”56 is the only official document to offer any justification what-
soever for the list of strategic partnerships. It says that Mexico should be
upgraded to the status of strategic partner of the EU because it is the last mem-
ber of the G8+557 left out. Nevertheless, this argument is no longer valid since
the announcement of a new strategic partnership with South Korea. Today the
EU counts ten strategic partners, perhaps by accident, raising questions about
their true strategic value and, eventually, opening room for debating our true
strategic partners.
This section offers reflections on various dimensions of the existing strategic
partnerships in order to identify what actually makes them strategic and what
prevents them from being considered as such. The objective of this section is to
put our fingers on problems and challenges, in order to produce sound recom-
mendations for the making of true strategic partnerships in the next section.
Are all strategic partnerships similar?
In light of the above list, the first argument is that the ten strategic partnerships
are neither identical nor equal.
Not all strategic partnerships are identical. Although all these relationships are
qualified a strategic partnership in either formal or informal documents, they
did not come into existence in the same way, nor are they at the same stage. On
the one hand, the relationships with Canada, Russia, the US and Japan – the
established powers – are regulated by just a few core documents and a continu-
ous political dialogue. The EU considers these long-standing relationships to be
inherently “strategic” for various reasons and their natural evolution did not
require over-formalisation. On the other hand, the EU finds it much more com-
plicated to regulate its relations with Brazil, India, China, South Africa, South
Korea and Mexico – the emerging powers – because it had to adapt to the rapid
emergence of these newcomers on the global stage. As the relationship did not
evolve as naturally as with the previous category of countries, and as bilateral
agreements with them were blossoming in every direction following their emer-
gence, the EU granted them a new kind of reward to maintain a comprehensive
framework for the relationship and ensure their continued commitment.
56. European Commission. 2008. Towards an EU-Mexico Strategic Partnership. op. cit.
57. The full members of the G8 are: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom,
and the United States. The G5, former Outreach 5, is composed of Brazil, China, India, Mexico and
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Not all strategic partnerships are equal. Strategic partners can be categorised as
follows. (1) The essential partner: the strategic partnership with the US seems to
be above any other partnership as the transatlantic relationship is certainly no
less important for Europe in today’s uncertain global environment than it was
in the past. This partnership is essential because little can be done without the
support of the American superpower. (2) The pivotal partners: our strategic
partnership with Russia and China, and to a certain extent with Brazil and
India, is more complex but almost as important to cope with contemporary
global challenges and achieve core EU foreign policy objectives. These partner-
ships are pivotal because they can tip the international balance to the benefit or
to the detriment of the EU depending on how we approach them. (3) The natural
allies: the strategic partnerships with Canada, Japan and South Korea appear
less strategic than those with the US or the BRIC countries. However, these
countries are not negligible as they are like-minded countries with a significant
footprint in international affairs (notably through their presence in the G8 and
the G20). (4) The regional partners: Mexico and South Africa are two dwarfs
among the strategic partners of the EU although they can bring a certain added
value at the regional level (probably more obviously in the case of South Africa
than that of Mexico).
To a certain extent the many differences among the ten strategic partners are
reflected also in the legal status of the relationship. Indeed, strategic partner-
ships are political statements or eventually can be seen as “soft law” instru-
ments, but they differ from the legal framework for the bilateral relationship.58
A quick overview of the legal frameworks established and under negotiation
between the EU and its strategic partners shows a large diversity of frameworks
and diverging priorities for each partnership. For instance, whereas all energy is
currently directed towards a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)
with Russia and China, efforts are channelled towards a Free Trade Agreement
(FTA) in the case of India.
Are all these partnerships truly strategic?
Following up on the first argument above, particularly on the observation that
not every partner is equal and that some might be inherently more strategic than
others (e.g. because of their military strength, economic weight, or geostrategic
position), a second argument can be developed: the cooperation of the EU with
58. SAUTENET Antoine. 2011. “EU and emerging powers: strategic partnerships”. In RENARD Thomas,
BISCOP Sven (eds). The coming order: the EU and emerging powers in the 21st century. Aldershot: Ash-
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its partners on international strategic issues is limited at best. It would be unre-
alistic to expect the EU to cooperate with all its partners on every single issue,
for various reasons, including that most issues are significant only to some part-
ners and not to others. Moreover, at times, the EU and its partners might have
diverging interests, making cooperation difficult, if not impossible. Neverthe-
less, there are a certain amount of key international strategic issues on which
one could reasonably expect the EU and its partners to develop at least a coor-
dinated approach or, better, a cooperative framework. Yet, this does not always
seem to be the case.
Three issues illustrate this well. We have selected these issues because they are
considered particularly important from a European perspective while recognis-
ing that our choice remains somewhat limitative and arbitrary. The three inter-
national strategic issues are: the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMD), conflict management, and climate change.
WMD proliferation. The EU identified the proliferation of WMD as one of its
key security challenges, “potentially the greatest threat to [Europe’s] security”.59
In principle, the EU shares this priority with all its strategic partners, some of
which are strong advocates of a nuclear-free world. This shared concern is often-
times recalled in joint statements on the occasion of bilateral summits, and there
even exist established dialogues on these issues with several partners. India
appears at first sight as the most problematic partner here in the sense that it has
refused to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) yet it is widely perceived as
a “natural partner”60 of the EU in dealing with new security challenges, includ-
ing proliferation, which is regularly discussed bilaterally through the security
dialogue.
The more we move away from the level of principle to a more concrete level,
however, the more we notice a lack of cooperation between the EU and its part-
ners – and even at times some form of clash. In the Iranian case, for instance, the
positions of China and Russia are particularly ambiguous and raise significant
concerns in Europe. Indeed, both countries seem reluctant to condemn the Ira-
nian nuclear programme, mainly for economic reasons (e.g. investment, arms
deals, or natural resources) whereas Europe is painfully yet unsuccessfully
attempting to lead the negotiations. The negative impact of their ambiguous
positions on their international image (and what it means for their relationship
59. Council of the European Union. 2003. A secure Europe in a better world – European Security Strat-
egy. op. cit., p.3
60. WAGNER Christian. 2008. “The EU and India: a deepening partnership”. In GREVI Giovanni, DE VAS-
CONCELOS Alvaro (eds). Partnerships for effective multilateralism: EU relations with Brazil, China, India
and Russia. Chaillot Paper 109. Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, p. 88.THE TREACHERY OF STRATEGIES: A CALL FOR TRUE EU STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS
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with Europe) or on long term regional stability does not seem to have sufficient
influence to make them switch positions, and Western negotiators seem clueless
as to how to involve them more. In the North Korean case, the EU’s involvement
is very limited, which in itself might be seen as a problem given the high stakes
for the region and for global security, not mentioning the fact that half of the
EU’s strategic partners are involved in the six-party talks.61 In fact, with the
exception of Iran, the EU has little or no impact in most key initiatives related
to non-proliferation, such as the New START (Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty), the six-party talks or the Indo-US nuclear deal.
Conflict management. There are a lot of conflicts and crises of all kinds around
the globe that need to be solved. Therefore, one could envision a lot of potential
for cooperation among strategic partners. Yet, in practice, cooperation remains
very limited. Each government sees the world from a different angle and part-
ners can cooperate when they share similar interests, but can also undermine
each other’s efforts or, worse, face each other across the frontline when their
interests clash, hence contributing more to the conflict than to its management.
In Georgia, for instance, Europeans found themselves in a direct clash with Rus-
sia. Such cases are the most challenging to the concept of strategic partnership.
In most cases however, the problem is not so much one of diverging interests but
rather one of too little cooperation between the EU and its strategic partners. In
Afghanistan, for instance, Europeans have been asking for more active support
from China, India and Russia, notably in the civilian field of operations, e.g.
related to police training or capacity-building. The reasons behind the lack of
cooperation can be manifold (including the result of a strategic decision by some
partners to engulf the EU and the US in strategic deadlocks while they can them-
selves focus freely on other strategic interests) but their constant occurrence is
surely a sign of the weakness of the strategic partnership. There are finally other
cases in which the EU is cooperating successfully – although to a limited degree
– with several of its partners. Yet this cooperation might at times hide another
problem, which is that such cooperation can possibly trigger concerns among
some partners. In the Gulf of Aden, for instance, the EU is cooperating with
several partners (including China, India and Japan) in counter-piracy opera-
tions, although an indirect consequence of these operations are the rising con-
cerns in Asia (but also among some in Europe and in the US) that China is using
these operations to develop its blue-water Navy, hence destabilising the regional
(and global) security order.
Another manner to assess how the EU cooperates with its partners in conflict
management is to look at UN peacekeeping operations, where they regularly
61. In addition to North Korea, the other parties are: China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the US.THE TREACHERY OF STRATEGIES: A CALL FOR TRUE EU STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS
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have the possibility to work constructively together in the UN framework (see
Table 1). In Lebanon, for instance, Europeans (5050) work alongside Indians
(899), South Koreans (369) and Chinese (344) in the UNIFIL mission. Yet the
level of involvement with UN peacekeeping operations varies from one partner
to another and barely reflects any form of strategic partnership. In terms of staff,
for instance, India is the biggest contributor, whereas China and Brazil have
significantly increased their contributions in recent years but not yet to similar
levels. European Member States contribute a big chunk as well, with over 7000
men and women. On the other hand, countries like Japan, Mexico, Russia or
the US contribute little to UN peacekeeping operations staff. In terms of finan-
cial contributions to the operations, it is a different story. Europe tops the chart,
covering over 40% of the total budget, and the US almost 30%. Japan is another
important financial contributor, although its contribution to the total budget in
relative terms diminished by over 35% over the last six years. All the other
partners are very small contributors, China covering for instance less than 4%
of the total budget and India 0.1%. As the EU and all its partners recognise the
legitimacy of the UN, one would expect that a true strategic partnership would
translate into greater cooperation and involvement in peacekeeping operations
yet practice shows otherwise.
Climate change. The EU identified climate change as a global challenge and as
a “threat multiplier”.62 However, the sense of urgency that is very palpable in
Europe is not shared by all our partners. Russia, for instance, does not seem
particularly concerned with the consequences of climate change.63 The same
could be said about India or China. The Copenhagen conference was a very
good illustration of how the EU can be sidelined by its own partners in interna-
tional negotiations of strategic importance to the EU, as the BASIC countries
(Brazil, South Africa, India and China) decided to negotiate a separate deal with
the US, keeping the Europeans outside the negotiation room. What was maybe
the most remarkable in Copenhagen was that the EU seemed unable to reach out
to its strategic partners, despite the fact that – for once – the EU was carrying a
single message.64 This again raises questions regarding the strategic nature of the
strategic partnerships.
62. Council of the European Union. 2008. Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strat-
egy – Providing Security in a Changing World. Brussels, p. 5.
63. FISCHER Sabine. 2008. “The EU and Russia: a contested partnership”. In GREVI Giovanni, DE VASCON-
CELOS Alvaro (eds). op. cit., pp. 128-130.
64. RENARD Thomas. 2010. “Le syndrome de Copenhague”. op. cit.THE TREACHERY OF STRATEGIES: A CALL FOR TRUE EU STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS
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Are these partnerships designed strategically?
A third argument that needs to be developed here is that the strategic partner-
ship status has little impact on the structural arrangements of the relationship
and on the EU institutional set-up. In fact, interviews with staff members of the
European Commission revealed that people dealing with the strategic partners
were sometimes barely aware that “their” country was a strategic partner and
in most cases had no clear idea of what a strategic partnership is and what it
means concretely. Most interviewees also had difficulties to identify significant
differences between dealing with a strategic partner or a non-strategic partner
country in their daily routine.65 According to one respondent, however, a stra-
tegic partnership introduced more dynamism internally (more dialogue among
EU institutions) and bilaterally (more intense and diversified exchanges).66
Bilateral structural arrangements. It could reasonably be expected that the
establishment of a strategic partnership with a third country would have an
impact on the scope and the depth of bilateral structural arrangements. Yet,
reality proves otherwise. For instance, we have a bilateral summit with all our
strategic partners, but this alone does not seem to be a consequence of having a
strategic partnership, as the EU had regular summits with South Korea before
the relationship was upgraded and as Brussels also has established regular sum-
mits with Pakistan and Ukraine which are not (yet) strategic partners. Moreover,
whereas the EU holds a summit with each partner, the pace can vary from bian-
nual (Russia) to annual (Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, South Africa,
South Korea and the US) to biennial (Mexico).
An overview of the political and sectoral dialogues between the EU and its stra-
tegic partners shows the gap that still exists in the diversity and intensity of
dialogues from one partner to another (see Table 2). For instance, the EU rightly
has more dialogues with the US and China than with other partners, covering a
broad spectrum of issues, whereas the underdevelopment of dialogues with
other partners (e.g. Russia) seems less comprehensible. Of course, it is not only
the amount and the scope of the dialogues that should be assessed but it is also
their effectiveness which should guide their future development. However, the
under-development of dialogues with some partners raises some questions
regarding the strategic nature of the partnership.
65. Interviews with staff members of the European Commission conducted in Brussels between 4 June
2010 and 7 July 2010.
66. Interview with a staff member of the European Commission, Brussels, 24 June 2010.THE TREACHERY OF STRATEGIES: A CALL FOR TRUE EU STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS
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Furthermore, in a strategic partnership, one would correctly expect that dia-
logues cover the broad spectrum of bilateral, regional and global issues. How-
ever, with various partners, some issues remain entirely unaddressed (at least
within the framework of established dialogues) or under-addressed. More
importantly, several partnerships have no established political and strategic dia-
logues, whereas there is no sectoral dialogue covering security and defence with
most partners (except for the US, Canada, China, and India). In these condi-
tions, it is difficult to qualify those partnerships as truly strategic.
Institutional set-up. It is striking so far that the strategic partnerships have had
no impact on the institutional organisation of the EU, more particularly on the
structure and composition of the EEAS. For instance, in the current organisation
chart,67 there is no person in charge of strategic partnerships (together or sepa-
rately), although it was whispered that the strategic planning cell could partly
address these questions.68 One could expect that some counsellors could partly
address these questions, but as these counsellors are not clearly established in
the hierarchy, their influence will pretty much depend upon their personal aura.
The lack of importance and visibility given to the strategic partnerships in the
EEAS organigramme is another sign of the lack of concrete follow-up on the
establishment of strategic partnerships. The unfortunate result will likely be
continuous problems of coordination and cooperation among different services
of the EEAS (e.g. in following a coherent strategy with all partners), among
different EU institutions (e.g. ensuring a coordinate approach with relevant
Commission DGs, such as DG Trade or DG Dev, and other relevant bodies), and
between the EU and its Member States (e.g. a link between the EEAS and the
national Ministries of Foreign Affairs), not mentioning coordination and coop-
eration with the partner itself. This absence of coordination mechanisms will
only make it harder – if not impossible – to develop a truly strategic approach
towards our partners.
An overview of the EU delegations in strategic partner countries confirms the
general absence of logical institutional reform following the establishment of a
strategic partnership (see Table 3). For instance, all delegations with no excep-
tion remain critically understaffed (particularly in comparison to the Member
States’ local embassies) despite the strategic importance of these countries and
the new functions devolved to the delegations following the implementation of
the Lisbon Treaty (e.g. the role of coordination and information-sharing among
the 27 embassies previously done by the rotating presidency), which would nor-
67. Official organization chart as of 23 February 2011, <http://www.eeas.europa.eu/background/docs/
eeas_organisation_en.pdf>
68. Interview with a member of the Cabinet of Catherine Ashton, Brussels, 11 February 2011.THE TREACHERY OF STRATEGIES: A CALL FOR TRUE EU STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS
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mally require significantly more human and financial resources, whereas dele-
gations have so far maintained their pre-Lisbon size. Even in the current format,
there are incomprehensible discrepancies among the ten delegations as their size
varies from less than 20 (South Korea and Canada) to over 100 (Russia and
China). Furthermore, being now relabelled “EU delegations” instead of “dele-
gations of the European Commission”, the composition of these delegations
could and should have significantly changed, opening more space for diplo-
matic and security staff (e.g. a military attaché) in line with the new compe-
tences and responsibilities of the delegations. One could even argue that some
responsibilities of the national embassies could be transferred to the EU delega-
tions in the future, provided it comes with staff and money, hence facilitating
budget cuts in most or all Member States’ foreign services (which they will do
anyway).69
The half-hearted implementation of the Lisbon Treaty so far has led to the
daunting task for EU delegations to do more with the same, unsurprisingly
resulting in dissatisfaction from most Member States and from many third coun-
tries, including some strategic partners. As a result, foreign capitals increasingly
turn directly towards the national embassies, mainly from the big Member
States, hence sowing the seeds of more fragmentation, contrary to the initial
goal of the Treaty.
Table 3: Staffing of EU delegations in strategic partner countries (as of March 2011)
69. EMERSON Michael, BALFOUR Rosa, CORTHAUT Tim, KACZYNSKI Piotr, RENARD Thomas, WOUTERS Jan.
2011. Upgrading the EU’s Role as Global Actor: Institutions, Law and the Restructuring of European
Diplomacy. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies.
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Is the EU a strategic partner?
A final argument developed here is that the EU is often perceived as the weak
end of the strategic partnerships. Indeed, looking at the world from Washington,
Beijing, New Delhi, or Moscow, the strategic value of the EU can be questioned
in light of its discrete profile on many issues of prime strategic importance,
including for Europe (think for instance about the current popular uprisings in
the Arab world). As a matter of fact, several strategic partners have proven bet-
ter at dividing Europe than at acting strategically alongside Europe to tackle
global challenges.70 To be frank, Europeans have very often rendered their task
easy.
Giovanni Grevi lists some of the reasons to explain why the EU is not seen as a
strategic partner: “Strategic partnerships require unity of purpose, focus, some-
times hard bargaining, a flexible negotiating posture and always political
authority. It is fair to say that today’s pivotal countries, whether established or
rising powers, question whether the EU is endowed with these attributes, except
on some trade issues.”71
Digging further into some of these reasons, we deem the lack of coordination
between the EU and its Member States one of the biggest constraints on the EU’s
strategic actorness. Member States, particularly big ones, will maintain for a
long time some form of national preferences in terms of foreign policy, but hope-
fully further developments of a truly common CFSP will narrow the gaps and
tensions between national interests. One of the key objectives of the EU today is
to push the CFSP forward by injecting small doses of rationality, good sense and
coordination at the core of European foreign policies, in order to make the EU
a more credible and perhaps more powerful actor. An EU speaking with one
voice is unrealistic in the short to medium term, at least as a generalised practice,
but it remains an ideal we must strive for in the long term. An EU bearing a
single message, on the other hand, seems more realistic in the short term and is
already a general practice in less sensitive issues. Whether this single message is
the right one or not is yet another issue.
Another major reason for the EU not to be considered as a strategic partner by
its counterparts is that it is an unpredictable actor due to its lack of grand strat-
egy, as was already alluded to above. If the EU is unable to identify its interests
70. See for instance FOX John, GODEMENT François. 2009. A power audit of EU-China relations. Policy
Report. London: European Council on Foreign Relations.
71. GREVI Giovanni. 2010. Making EU strategic partnerships effective. Working Paper 105. Madrid:
FRIDE, p. 8.THE TREACHERY OF STRATEGIES: A CALL FOR TRUE EU STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS
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and its values and articulate them coherently in a strategy, then strategic part-
nerships are simply meaningless and useless to both parties.
In a broader perspective, the challenge for the EU is to be considered as a stra-
tegic partner, a notion with clear realpolitik resonance, while promoting a Kan-
tian vision of the world through its so-called normative power.72 There is an
inherent tension within the EU between modernist and postmodernist visions of
the world73 leading to ambiguous rhetoric and hybrid foreign policy, and always
resulting in confusion. This tension in itself is not a problem; the source of the
problem lies in our fundamental incapacity to channel this tension into a coher-
ent and constructive global vision.
72. LAÏDI Zaki. 2005. La norme sans la force: L’énigme de la puissance européenne. Paris: Presses de
Sciences Po.
73. COOPER Robert. 2003. The breaking of nations: Order and chaos in the twenty-first century. London:
Atlantic Press.35
5. “WE HAVE STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS, NOW 
WE NEED A STRATEGY”
Strategic partnerships are only strategic in name, for now. A historical overview
of documents and debates shows the total absence of strategic rationale behind
the elaboration of strategic partnerships since the very beginning, with no defi-
nition of the concept or of its fundamental objectives, and an ad hoc selection
of partners. This process of a-strategic thinking led to a repetition of past fail-
ures as the EU is now facing similar problems as it was ten years ago with the
Common Strategies, from which the partnerships derived, namely the difficulty
to turn rhetoric into concrete policies of strategic value vis-à-vis our partners. A
set of interviews with EU officials and European diplomats confirmed that stra-
tegic partnerships are to this day empty of any substance. As the previous sec-
tion of this paper demonstrated, strategic partnerships are not so strategic when
looked at up-close for a variety of reasons, including that 1) not every partner
is equally strategic; 2) the EU is not cooperating with its partners on most truly
strategic issues; 3) the strategic partnership has no structural or institutional
impact on the relationship; 4) or, finally, the EU itself is simply not considered a
strategic partner in many cases. As some other authors have observed: “The use
of the label ‘strategic partnership’ in fact functions as a rhetorical façade which
masks the reality that the EU has failed to transform the relations” with other
global powers into strategic partnerships.74
This comes as no surprise for regular observers of EU foreign policy, as strategic
partnerships simply follow the general pattern of a systematic lack of strategic
approach in international affairs, which has been highlighted for many years by
various scholars.75 More broadly, strategic partnerships enter the long European
tradition of ‘strategic hyperbole’ consisting in the adoption of strategies on any-
thing and everything – and thus nothing. There are, for instance, strategies on
external security, internal security, terrorism, WMD proliferation, neighbour-
hood, rare materials, growth, etc. Through the adoption of all these documents,
the EU flatters itself with the image of a global power active on every front, but
the EU is in fact generally unable to maintain the illusion for long. Worse:
through the adoption of these strategies, the EU increases expectations from
other global actors, which can thereafter only be disappointed by the lack of
European commitment. This risk now seems to materialise: indeed, the fact that
74. KEUKELEIRE Stephan, BRUYNINCKX Hans. 2011. “The European Union, the BRICs, and the emerging
new world order”. In HILL Christopher, SMITH Michael. International Relations and the European Union.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 389.
75. BISCOP Sven, ANDERSSON Jan Joel (eds). op. cit.; HILL Christopher, SMITH Michael. 2011. International
Relations and the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press; TOJE Asle. 2010. The European
Union as a small power: After the post-Cold War. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.THE TREACHERY OF STRATEGIES: A CALL FOR TRUE EU STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS
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these strategic openings have been created has now generated expectations on
the part of established and emerging powers that may once more find themselves
disappointed by the lack of (re-)action on the European side. The consequences
of this désenchantement could be absolutely dramatic, as Europe’s marginalisa-
tion in the increasingly multipolar order will only grow.
Although strategic thinking was absent, the reasons to establish strategic part-
nerships were present and sensible. First, the partnerships started to take shape
with the 2003 ESS, that is to say after the invasion of Iraq – a jolt to Europeans
who realised that the transatlantic alliance cannot tackle and solve all global
challenges, in view of our potential strategic dissensions. In this context, the EU
needed to reaffirm the importance of the transatlantic relationship, while open-
ing the possibility of new strategic partnerships with rising powers. Second and
related to the first, in the context of rising multipolarity and interdependence,
the EU needed to address the emergence of new powers in order to ensure their
commitment to solving today’s challenges, and to deepen and strengthen our
partnership today in order to better address tomorrow’s challenges. Third, stra-
tegic partnerships were a reaction to the failure of the EU’s interregional and
multilateral approach of international affairs, as well as to the frustrations aris-
ing from the stagnation of bilateral relations with emerging powers. The part-
nerships then appeared as an alternative to reinvigorate European diplomacy in
an international context of return to realpolitik in which bilateral approaches
seem to dominate international relations, even in multilateral forums. Finally,
strategic partnerships constitute an attempt to assert the growing importance of
the EU over the national diplomacies of the Member States, not least because
according to the Lisbon Treaty, the EU now has the tools and legitimacy to act
in the name of Europe vis-à-vis third countries.
These four reasons were certainly compelling enough to launch strategic part-
nerships, and they remain more relevant than ever. Having this in mind, the
demise of the concept is simply neither desirable nor recommendable, although
strategic partnerships should certainly be reviewed. Herman Van Rompuy
understood this and translated it into a catchy yet right-on quote: “We have
strategic partnerships, now we need a strategy.”76 This author would add: we
need a grand strategy for the EU to identify our interests and a (sub-)strategy for
the strategic partnerships to pursue them strategically.
The concept of strategic partnership re-emerged in Brussels circles under the
impulse of Herman Van Rompuy, first in a speech, then calling on the input of
76. VAN ROMPUY Herman. 2010. We have strategic partnerships, now we need a strategy. Message video
from Herman Van Rompuy, 14 September. <http://vloghvr.consilium.europa.eu/?p=2377>THE TREACHERY OF STRATEGIES: A CALL FOR TRUE EU STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS
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Member States via an extraordinary European Council dedicated to this issue in
September 2010, making it one of the top priorities of the EU foreign policy
agenda. It should come as no surprise that this debate was revived by an EU
figure (moreover, one from a small pro-European Member State), given the
reluctance of most Member States (particularly big ones) to significantly
empower the EU in matters related to foreign policy, especially when dealing
with great powers. In fact, the importance of the Lisbon Treaty to the revival of
this debate cannot be underscored sufficiently: 1) the Lisbon Treaty offers a legal
framework to the strategic partnerships in its Article 21 (“the Union shall seek
to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and interna-
tional, regional or global organisations which share the principles referred to in
the first subparagraph”) and Article 22 (“on the basis of the principles and
objectives set out in Article 21, the European Council shall identify the strategic
interests and objectives of the Union”); 2) the Lisbon Treaty offered new oppor-
tunities to the EU in terms of foreign policy, notably via the creation of the EEAS
and via greater interaction among various dimensions of foreign policy (e.g.
diplomacy, development, trade, finance, energy or climate change); and 3) the
creation and designation of two new positions according to the Lisbon Treaty
(President of the European Council and High Representative) who were favour-
able to a revival of this debate.
The re-emergence of the concept of strategic partnership is positive, and the
conclusions of the September 2010 European Council indicate that there is some
willingness to put substance into it. Now, EU observers will look at the progress
reports coming from Catherine Ashton and at the bilateral summits with the
EU’s strategic partners, to assess progress on the strategic partnerships. Events
in the Arab world – as important as they are – should not distract the EU from
its vital long-term strategic interest: secure a relevant status in the coming
multipolar environment dominated by great powers.
This paper welcomes the revival of a debate on strategic partnerships, and it
argues that it should be pushed even further. In a world ever less centred on
European interests, the EU and its Member States must develop a more innova-
tive and effective diplomacy vis-à-vis established and emerging powers. How-
ever, as it was emphasised throughout this paper, the strategic nature of the
partnerships and of the EU itself is largely questioned. To come back to the
opening quote of this paper, it is “the attempt and not the deed [that] confounds
us”. The high rhetoric of the strategic partnerships (the “treachery” as the title
of this paper has it) is confounding the EU’s partners and the EU. It is now time
to take action for establishing true strategic partnerships and make them work.THE TREACHERY OF STRATEGIES: A CALL FOR TRUE EU STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS
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Some recommendations
The EU needs to turn (some of) its existing strategic partnerships into true stra-
tegic partnerships. To do that, the EU and its Member States need to develop a
strategic approach to international relations, and more particularly to their rela-
tions with great and emerging powers. Internally, the development of this stra-
tegic approach entails the revival of a debate on EU strategic interests, a review
of the EU institutional set-up, a restructuration of its diplomacy, and the estab-
lishment of coordination mechanisms within the EU and between the EU and its
Member States. Bilaterally, a strategic approach would be visible notably
through increased dialogue between the EU and its partners – rather than the
often observed cross-monologues when both parties speak but do not listen to
each other – as well as through increased cooperation on a broad spectrum of
issues, including on strategic questions of relevance to both actors as this dimen-
sion is still mostly missing to this day . Finally , the EU ought to reconcile its
bilateral approach to strategic partnerships with its more traditional multilat-
eral approach to international relations and its fundamental objective – as stated
in the 2003 ESS – to promote effective multilateralism globally.
To make the recommendations as clear and readable as possible, they are writ-
ten down in a table, distinguishing recommendations for the short term (5 years
framework) and recommendations for the medium term (10 years framework).39
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o
 
o
n
e
 
g
l
o
b
a
l
 
s
t
r
a
t
-
e
g
y
 
v
i
s
-
à
-
v
i
s
 
o
u
r
 
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
i
c
 
p
a
r
t
n
e
r
s
 
(
i
.
e
.
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
f
o
r
m
 
a
 
s
i
n
g
l
e
 
d
o
c
u
m
e
n
t
)
.
 
I
n
 
t
h
e
n
e
x
t
 
s
t
e
p
s
,
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
f
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
w
i
l
l
 
h
a
v
e
 
t
o
 
n
a
r
r
o
w
 
a
n
d
 
b
r
o
a
d
e
n
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
s
a
m
e
 
t
i
m
e
:
1
)
 
n
a
r
r
o
w
 
t
h
e
 
k
e
y
 
l
e
s
s
o
n
s
 
a
n
d
 
r
e
c
o
m
m
e
n
d
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
t
o
 
e
a
c
h
 
p
a
r
t
n
e
r
s
h
i
p
;
 
2
)
b
r
o
a
d
e
n
 
t
h
e
 
d
e
b
a
t
e
 
t
o
 
l
i
n
k
 
t
o
 
d
i
s
c
u
s
s
i
o
n
s
 
o
n
 
E
U
 
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
i
c
 
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
s
 
w
o
r
l
d
w
i
d
e
,
i
.
e
.
 
d
e
b
a
t
e
s
 
o
n
 
a
 
n
e
w
 
E
S
S
 
w
o
r
t
h
 
t
h
e
 
n
a
m
e
 
(
a
 
t
r
u
e
 
E
U
 
g
r
a
n
d
 
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
y
)
.
A
6
-
 
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
o
r
d
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
p
o
l
i
c
i
e
s
 
a
m
o
n
g
 
M
e
m
b
e
r
 
S
t
a
t
e
s
 
v
i
s
-
à
-
v
i
s
 
E
U
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
i
c
 
p
a
r
t
n
e
r
s
 
i
n
 
o
r
d
e
r
 
t
o
 
a
v
o
i
d
 
a
s
 
m
u
c
h
 
a
s
 
p
o
s
s
i
b
l
e
 
a
 
c
l
a
s
h
i
n
g
 
o
f
 
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
a
p
p
r
o
a
c
h
e
s
,
 
p
a
r
t
i
c
u
l
a
r
l
y
 
i
n
 
k
e
y
 
i
s
s
u
e
s
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
E
U
.
 
T
h
e
 
r
o
l
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
‘
f
o
c
a
l
’
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
(
s
e
e
 
r
e
c
o
m
m
e
n
d
a
t
i
o
n
 
A
1
)
 
s
h
o
u
l
d
 
b
e
 
p
a
r
t
i
c
u
l
a
r
l
y
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t
 
i
n
 
t
h
i
s
 
e
n
d
e
a
v
o
u
r
,
b
u
t
 
d
i
s
c
u
s
s
i
o
n
s
 
w
i
t
h
i
n
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
f
o
r
u
m
s
 
s
h
o
u
l
d
 
a
l
s
o
 
a
d
d
r
e
s
s
 
t
h
i
s
 
p
r
o
b
l
e
m
 
(
e
.
g
.
P
S
C
 
m
e
e
t
i
n
g
s
,
 
F
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
A
f
f
a
i
r
s
 
C
o
u
n
c
i
l
,
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
C
o
u
n
c
i
l
)
.
 
T
h
e
 
E
U
 
a
n
d
 
i
t
s
 
2
7
M
e
m
b
e
r
 
S
t
a
t
e
s
 
c
a
r
r
y
i
n
g
 
o
n
e
 
s
i
n
g
l
e
 
m
e
s
s
a
g
e
 
v
i
s
-
à
-
v
i
s
 
o
u
r
 
p
a
r
t
n
e
r
s
 
s
h
o
u
l
d
 
b
e
 
a
d
a
i
l
y
 
o
b
j
e
c
t
i
v
e
,
 
w
h
e
r
e
a
s
 
a
 
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
 
o
b
j
e
c
t
i
v
e
 
w
o
u
l
d
 
b
e
 
t
o
 
a
v
o
i
d
 
o
v
e
r
t
 
c
l
a
s
h
e
s
o
n
 
k
e
y
 
i
s
s
u
e
s
 
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
 
a
 
b
e
t
t
e
r
 
c
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
s
 
w
i
t
h
i
n
t
h
e
 
E
U
 
a
n
d
 
a
n
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
i
v
e
 
s
e
a
r
c
h
 
f
o
r
 
c
o
m
p
r
o
m
i
s
e
.
B
3
-
 
R
e
v
i
e
w
 
t
h
e
 
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
i
c
 
a
p
p
r
o
a
c
h
 
t
o
 
o
u
r
 
p
a
r
t
n
e
r
s
h
i
p
s
 
o
n
 
a
 
r
e
g
u
l
a
r
 
b
a
s
i
s
,
 
t
o
a
s
s
e
s
s
 
t
h
e
i
r
 
i
m
p
l
e
m
e
n
t
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
n
o
t
a
b
l
y
 
v
i
a
 
f
o
l
l
o
w
-
u
p
 
m
e
c
h
a
n
i
s
m
s
.
 
C
o
n
d
u
c
t
 
a
t
h
o
r
o
u
g
h
 
r
e
v
i
e
w
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
i
c
 
p
a
r
t
n
e
r
s
h
i
p
s
 
e
v
e
r
y
 
f
i
v
e
 
y
e
a
r
s
 
(
o
r
 
a
t
 
l
e
a
s
t
 
o
n
 
a
r
e
g
u
l
a
r
 
b
a
s
i
s
)
,
 
i
n
 
o
r
d
e
r
 
t
o
 
e
n
s
u
r
e
 
t
h
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
y
 
i
s
 
u
p
-
t
o
-
d
a
t
e
 
i
n
 
a
 
r
a
p
i
d
l
y
c
h
a
n
g
i
n
g
 
e
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
.
B
4
-
 
T
h
e
 
E
U
 
s
h
o
u
l
d
 
s
t
r
i
v
e
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
a
c
t
i
c
e
 
o
f
 
a
 
s
i
n
g
l
e
 
v
o
i
c
e
 
p
o
l
i
c
y
,
 
a
t
 
m
i
n
i
m
u
m
i
n
 
i
s
s
u
e
s
 
o
f
 
e
x
c
l
u
s
i
v
e
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
e
n
c
e
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
E
U
,
 
b
u
t
 
s
l
o
w
l
y
 
e
x
t
e
n
d
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
a
c
t
i
c
e
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
d
o
m
a
i
n
 
o
f
 
s
h
a
r
e
d
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
e
n
c
e
s
 
o
n
 
k
e
y
 
i
s
s
u
e
s
 
w
h
e
r
e
 
a
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
c
o
n
-
s
e
n
s
u
s
 
h
a
s
 
e
m
e
r
g
e
d
,
 
i
n
 
o
r
d
e
r
 
t
o
 
a
l
l
o
w
 
t
h
e
 
E
U
 
t
o
 
p
u
l
l
 
i
t
s
 
f
u
l
l
 
d
i
p
l
o
m
a
t
i
c
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
.
A
 
s
i
n
g
l
e
 
m
e
s
s
a
g
e
,
 
h
o
w
e
v
e
r
,
 
i
s
 
l
i
k
e
l
y
 
t
o
 
r
e
m
a
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
m
o
s
t
 
c
o
m
m
o
n
 
p
r
a
c
t
i
c
e
.
B
i
l
a
t
e
r
a
l
 
a
r
r
a
n
g
e
m
e
n
t
s
A
7
-
 
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
t
h
e
 
E
U
 
c
o
o
r
d
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
 
w
i
t
h
 
i
t
s
 
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
i
c
 
p
a
r
t
n
e
r
s
,
 
n
o
t
a
b
l
y
 
v
i
a
 
a
n
e
n
h
a
n
c
e
d
 
r
o
l
e
 
f
o
r
 
E
U
 
d
e
l
e
g
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
(
s
e
e
 
r
e
c
o
m
m
e
n
d
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
A
3
 
&
 
A
4
)
,
 
b
u
t
 
a
l
s
o
v
i
a
 
a
 
r
e
t
h
i
n
k
i
n
g
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
a
r
c
h
i
t
e
c
t
u
r
e
 
o
f
 
e
a
c
h
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
h
i
p
 
w
i
t
h
 
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
 
a
t
t
e
n
t
i
o
n
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
i
v
e
 
a
s
 
w
e
l
l
 
a
s
 
c
o
m
p
r
e
h
e
n
s
i
v
e
 
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
i
c
 
a
n
d
 
s
e
c
t
o
-
r
a
l
 
d
i
a
l
o
g
u
e
s
.
 
B
i
l
a
t
e
r
a
l
 
m
e
c
h
a
n
i
s
m
s
 
c
a
n
 
b
e
 
c
r
e
a
t
e
d
 
t
o
 
m
e
d
i
a
t
e
 
i
n
 
c
a
s
e
 
o
f
 
c
o
n
-
f
l
i
c
t
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
t
h
e
 
E
U
 
a
n
d
 
i
t
s
 
p
a
r
t
n
e
r
s
.
A
8
-
 
B
e
y
o
n
d
 
c
o
o
r
d
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
c
o
n
f
l
i
c
t
 
m
e
d
i
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
t
h
e
 
E
U
 
s
h
o
u
l
d
 
b
e
 
l
o
o
k
i
n
g
f
o
r
 
c
o
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
w
i
t
h
 
i
t
s
 
p
a
r
t
n
e
r
s
 
o
n
 
a
 
c
a
s
e
-
b
y
-
c
a
s
e
 
b
a
s
i
s
 
i
n
 
o
r
d
e
r
 
t
o
 
c
r
e
a
t
e
 
a
c
u
l
t
u
r
e
 
o
f
 
c
o
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
.
 
T
h
i
s
 
c
o
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
c
a
n
 
s
t
a
r
t
 
o
n
 
b
e
n
i
g
n
 
i
s
s
u
e
s
 
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
 
y
e
t
 
a
t
t
h
e
 
m
a
r
g
i
n
s
 
o
f
 
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
i
c
 
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
r
e
f
o
r
e
 
c
r
e
a
t
e
 
a
 
s
p
i
l
l
-
o
v
e
r
 
d
y
n
a
m
i
c
 
t
o
k
e
y
 
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
i
c
 
i
s
s
u
e
s
.
A
9
-
 
W
e
 
s
h
o
u
l
d
 
m
a
s
s
i
v
e
l
y
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
 
i
n
 
e
f
f
o
r
t
s
 
t
o
 
b
r
i
n
g
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
s
o
c
i
e
t
y
 
c
l
o
s
e
r
 
t
o
t
h
e
 
s
o
c
i
e
t
i
e
s
 
o
f
 
o
u
r
 
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
i
c
 
p
a
r
t
n
e
r
s
.
 
A
 
t
r
u
l
y
 
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
i
c
 
p
a
r
t
n
e
r
s
h
i
p
 
i
m
p
l
i
e
s
 
t
h
e
b
u
i
l
d
i
n
g
 
o
f
 
b
r
i
d
g
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
t
e
a
r
i
n
g
 
d
o
w
n
 
o
f
 
w
a
l
l
s
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
o
u
r
 
c
o
m
m
u
n
i
t
i
e
s
.
W
h
a
t
 
m
a
k
e
s
 
a
 
p
a
r
t
n
e
r
s
h
i
p
 
t
r
u
l
y
 
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
i
c
 
i
s
 
n
o
t
 
s
o
 
m
u
c
h
 
c
o
m
m
o
n
 
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
s
 
(
i
n
t
h
i
s
 
r
e
g
a
r
d
,
 
e
v
e
n
 
o
u
r
 
p
a
r
t
n
e
r
s
h
i
p
 
w
i
t
h
 
t
h
e
 
U
S
 
i
s
 
n
o
t
 
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
i
c
)
 
b
u
t
 
i
n
s
t
e
a
d
m
u
t
u
a
l
 
u
n
d
e
r
s
t
a
n
d
i
n
g
 
a
n
d
,
 
i
n
 
t
i
m
e
,
 
a
 
c
o
m
m
o
n
 
u
n
d
e
r
s
t
a
n
d
i
n
g
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
w
o
r
l
d
.
B
r
i
d
g
e
s
 
c
a
n
 
t
a
k
e
 
t
h
e
 
f
o
r
m
 
o
f
 
p
a
r
l
i
a
m
e
n
t
a
r
y
 
e
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
,
 
c
i
v
i
l
 
s
o
c
i
e
t
y
 
d
i
a
l
o
g
u
e
s
,
e
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
e
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
p
r
o
g
r
a
m
m
e
s
 
o
r
 
c
u
l
t
u
r
a
l
 
e
v
e
n
t
s
.
B
5
-
 
T
h
e
 
E
U
 
s
h
o
u
l
d
 
s
t
r
i
v
e
 
f
o
r
 
c
o
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
w
i
t
h
 
i
t
s
 
p
a
r
t
n
e
r
s
 
o
n
 
c
o
r
e
 
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
i
c
i
s
s
u
e
s
,
 
u
s
i
n
g
 
c
o
o
r
d
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
c
o
n
f
l
i
c
t
 
m
e
d
i
a
t
i
o
n
 
m
e
c
h
a
n
i
s
m
s
 
a
s
 
a
 
b
a
s
i
s
 
y
e
t
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
i
n
g
l
y
 
m
o
v
i
n
g
 
t
o
w
a
r
d
s
 
c
o
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
w
h
e
n
 
d
e
e
m
e
d
 
n
e
c
e
s
s
a
r
y
.
B
6
-
 
C
o
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
s
h
o
u
l
d
 
e
x
t
e
n
d
 
t
o
 
c
o
r
e
 
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
i
c
 
i
s
s
u
e
s
.
A
-
 
S
h
o
r
t
 
t
e
r
m
 
(
5
 
y
e
a
r
s
)
B
-
 
M
e
d
i
u
m
 
t
e
r
m
 
(
1
0
 
y
e
a
r
s
)41
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M
u
l
t
i
l
a
t
e
r
a
l
 
a
r
r
a
n
g
e
m
e
n
t
s
A
1
0
-
 
S
i
m
i
l
a
r
l
y
 
t
o
 
r
e
c
o
m
m
e
n
d
a
t
i
o
n
 
A
6
,
 
t
h
e
 
E
U
 
s
h
o
u
l
d
 
b
o
o
s
t
 
c
o
o
r
d
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
n
d
 
c
o
n
f
l
i
c
t
 
m
e
d
i
a
t
i
o
n
 
m
e
c
h
a
n
i
s
m
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
i
t
s
 
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
i
c
 
p
a
r
t
n
e
r
s
 
w
i
t
h
i
n
 
m
u
l
t
i
-
l
a
t
e
r
a
l
 
f
o
r
u
m
s
,
 
i
n
 
o
r
d
e
r
 
t
o
 
p
u
r
s
u
e
 
c
o
m
m
o
n
 
o
b
j
e
c
t
i
v
e
s
,
 
o
r
 
a
t
 
l
e
a
s
t
 
t
o
 
a
v
o
i
d
u
n
n
e
c
e
s
s
a
r
y
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
c
l
a
s
h
e
s
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
a
r
e
 
d
e
t
r
i
m
e
n
t
a
l
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
g
l
o
b
a
l
 
i
m
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
h
i
p
 
a
n
d
 
o
f
 
m
u
l
t
i
l
a
t
e
r
a
l
i
s
m
.
A
1
1
-
 
T
h
e
 
E
U
 
s
h
o
u
l
d
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
 
a
 
m
e
t
a
-
d
i
a
l
o
g
u
e
 
o
n
 
m
u
l
t
i
l
a
t
e
r
a
l
i
s
m
 
w
i
t
h
 
i
t
s
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
i
c
 
p
a
r
t
n
e
r
s
 
i
n
 
o
r
d
e
r
 
t
o
 
c
o
m
p
a
r
e
 
p
e
r
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
m
u
l
t
i
l
a
t
e
r
a
l
 
a
r
c
h
i
-
t
e
c
t
u
r
e
 
w
i
t
h
 
a
 
v
i
e
w
 
o
n
 
a
 
n
e
c
e
s
s
a
r
y
 
r
e
f
o
r
m
 
o
f
 
g
l
o
b
a
l
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
a
n
c
e
.
B
7
-
 
T
h
e
 
E
U
 
s
h
o
u
l
d
 
w
o
r
k
 
t
o
w
a
r
d
s
 
m
o
r
e
 
c
o
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
w
i
t
h
i
n
 
m
u
l
t
i
l
a
t
e
r
a
l
f
r
a
m
e
w
o
r
k
s
,
 
i
n
 
o
r
d
e
r
 
t
o
 
r
e
c
o
n
c
i
l
e
 
t
h
e
 
b
i
l
a
t
e
r
a
l
 
a
p
p
r
o
a
c
h
 
o
f
 
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
i
c
 
p
a
r
t
n
e
r
-
s
h
i
p
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
t
h
e
 
E
U
 
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
f
o
r
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
i
v
e
 
m
u
l
t
i
l
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r
a
l
i
s
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o
u
l
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l
e
a
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s
o
r
t
 
o
f
 
g
r
a
n
d
 
b
a
r
g
a
i
n
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
a
n
 
o
v
e
r
-
r
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
e
d
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
 
a
n
d
 
u
n
d
e
r
-
r
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
e
d
 
e
m
e
r
g
i
n
g
 
p
o
w
e
r
s
t
o
 
r
e
f
o
r
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g
l
o
b
a
l
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
a
n
c
e
 
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
s
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h
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g
r
a
n
d
 
b
a
r
g
a
i
n
 
s
h
o
u
l
d
 
b
e
 
c
o
m
-
p
e
n
s
a
t
e
d
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
s
i
d
e
 
b
y
 
a
 
r
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
i
s
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
E
U
 
r
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
a
t
i
o
n
a
n
d
 
s
t
a
t
u
s
 
w
i
t
h
i
n
 
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
o
r
g
a
n
i
s
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
a
n
d
 
n
e
g
o
t
i
a
t
i
o
n
s
,
 
i
n
 
l
i
n
e
 
w
i
t
h
 
i
t
s
c
o
m
p
e
t
e
n
c
e
s
.
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a
.
G
r
e
v
i
 
G
i
o
v
a
n
n
i
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i
t
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.
E
m
e
r
s
o
n
 
M
i
c
h
a
e
l
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
 
o
p
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c
i
t
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I
b
i
d
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r
s
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e
d
i
u
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t
e
r
m
 
(
1
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y
e
a
r
s
)